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# List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Constituency Development Fund</td>
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<td>Deputy Chief Justice</td>
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<td>Electoral Commission of Kenya</td>
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<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
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<td>KNDR</td>
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<td>LATF</td>
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<td>National Accord and Reconciliation Act</td>
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<td>NARC</td>
<td>National Rainbow Coalition</td>
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<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Land Commission</td>
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<td>ODM</td>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>PEV</td>
<td>Post Election Violence</td>
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<td>PNU</td>
<td>Party of National Unity</td>
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<td>SRIC</td>
<td>Security Research &amp; Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>TJRC</td>
<td>Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>YEDF</td>
<td>Youth Enterprise Development Fund</td>
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Context
The agitation for institutional and political reforms in Kenya could be traced to the early 1990s following changes in the international geopolitics and unprecedented levels of citizenry assertiveness and restiveness in reaction to what was viewed as the (then) regime’s dictatorial tendencies. The end of cold war in late 1980s and early 1990s had a ripple effect all over the world. In most of the developing countries and particularly in Africa where tyrannical and dictatorial leadership had taken root, their continued hold on power increasingly became scrutinized and fragile. Soon, calls for opening up democratic space and inclusive leadership that was based on equity took the centre stage.

In Kenya, the then ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) regime bowed to local and international pressure in 1991 through repealing of Section 2A of the Constitution that had made Kenya a one-party state. The repeal (constitutional amendment) gave birth to the era of multi-party politics in Kenya. However, the ruling regime managed to maintain status quo by entrenching divide and rule tactics, much to the chagrin of pro-reform voices. Although KANU won the 1992 and 1997 General Elections, the agitation for more reforms continued culminating to the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) agreements in 1997 that further opened the political space.

The IPPG agreement, although not legislated into law, provided some level playing field in the Kenyans politics for the first time. The agreement allowed opposition parties in parliament to participate in the nomination of Commissioners of Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) and, as noted by Kriegler report, (the report of the Independent Review of Election Commission, 2008), also led to the amendment of the Public Order Act, which removed the need for licenses and permits with respect to holding of public meetings other than notifying the nearest officer commanding police station of the meeting.
Indeed, the agitation for reforms continued throughout the 1990s culminating to the defeat of KANU in 2002 General Elections by Kibaki led National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) which came into power with overwhelming endorsement.

Although the NARC regime was greeted with unprecedented level of exuberance, fallout between President Kibaki and Raila Odinga that ensued soon after conspired to deny Kenyans desired reforms. For instance, the country missed an opportunity to realize a new constitution in 2005 during a national referendum. This marked the beginning of the polarization of the country culminating to the 2007/2008 Post Election Violence (PEV).

The PEV was unprecedented in scale, intensity and severity. Security machinery was unable to prevent loss of at least 1,300 lives, internal displacement of over 650,000 Kenyans and destruction of property worth billions of Kenya shillings. In response to PEV, the African Union named a Panel of Eminent African Leaders led by His Excellency Kofi Annan to lead a national mediation process under the auspices of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR).

The KNDR process led to a four point agenda namely:

- Agenda One: Immediate Action to Stop Violence and Restore Fundamental Rights and Liberties,
- Agenda Two: Address the Humanitarian Crisis, Promote Reconciliation, Healing and Restoration of Stability
- Agenda Three: Resolve the Political Crisis (a power-sharing agreement)
- Agenda Four: Address Long standing grievances.

The long term issues that were to be addressed under Agenda four include Constitutional reforms, Land reforms,
Inequality and regional imbalances, unemployment, particularly among the youth and impunity.

The promulgation of a new constitution in August 2010 marked a historic watershed in the country’s governance architecture and a major achievement of a key Agenda Four reform item. The adoption of a new constitutional dispensation was seen as launching pad for effecting the set of wide-ranging reforms that the country had long yearned for.

Quite naturally, the adoption of a new Constitution was greeted with unprecedented optimism by Kenyans. However, and as was found by the bi-annual survey, majority of Kenyans know or took little interest in the wide range of transformative security, governance and justice structures that the constitution had brought forth.

In light of the above scenario, and considering that the country is moving closer to the next General Election scheduled for 4th March 2013, it is crucial to periodically gauge Kenyans’ level of knowledge, attitude and perceptions on a raft of reform measures being undertaken, the findings of which can then be used to inform the kind of interventions to improve public participation in the reform agenda.
2.0 The Bi-Annual Survey

Between October 2011 and March 2012, SRIC commissioned a bi-annual perception survey in order to find out the extend of Kenyans participation in the reform process. The Survey covered a sample of eighteen (18) Counties and identified major public and community concerns as relates to the reform process in Kenya.

The objective of the survey was to establish the public’s level of understanding and perception of the Agenda Four reform process, and to identify and communicate major public and community concerns to relevant government departments and agencies, civil society groups, the private sector and the donor community.

The outcome of the survey is expected to stimulate quality and informed public debate and contribute to a more vibrant and robust dialogue meetings between relevant government departments and agencies, civil society groups, the private sector and the donor community.

2.1 Methodology

The survey sampled 18 of the 47 Counties in Kenya. In choosing the Counties, both stratified and simple random sampling methods were used. The stratified method was used to choose five (5) Counties based on a number of considerations; county ethnic and demographic heterogeneity, socio-economic and geo-political dynamics, political inclinations and the degree to which locals suffered during the 2007/08 post election violence (PEV). Based on these, Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Kericho and Kisumu were selected. On the other hand, simple random sampling method was used to choose the other 13 Counties; namely Nyeri, Isiolo, Elgeiyo Marakwet, Trans-Nzoia, Busia, Kakamega, Kirinyaga, Kiambu, Machakos, Kitui, Kwale, Kilifi and Garissa.

A total of 1900 questionnaires were used in the 18
counties with 1810 administered to the general public and 90 to key informants, who on account of their positions in society, were deemed to possess valuable knowledge and expertise on the reform process in the country. The questionnaires were designed to collect both quantitative and qualitative data respectively.

The data collected was analyzed quantitatively using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and qualitatively through interpretation of the various responses, generated through Key Informant Interviews.

2. 2 Key Reform Issues

In order to track the pace and quality of the implementation of the Agenda Four reforms including the new constitution, the survey sought to elicit feedback and generate informed discussions on the following contemporary issues amongst others:

2.2.1 Police reforms

In Kenya the police play a major role in ensuring that citizens are safe at all times. Both the Waki and Kriegler reports observed that the police service was ill prepared to deal with PEV hence the need to reform it. To ensure effectiveness in the police service, the constitution recommended a multiplicity of reform items which this survey sought to interrogate.

2.1.2 Judicial reforms

For along time, the Judiciary had been accused of being corrupt and an appendage of the executive and the rich. As a result, the dispute that arose during the final tally of the 2007 Presidential results saw the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) eschew from the court process. Besides, judicial reforms are some of the key Agenda 4 items while the constitution provides a raft of remedies including “high moral character, integrity and impartiality” for judicial officers.
2.2.3 The Land Question
Land has remained a major problem in Kenya for many years. The historical land injustices and corruption in the allocation of land has created antagonism and bitterness among Kenyans.

For Kenya to progress peacefully, the issue of land need to be looked into and addressed. The legislated Land Acts are thus expected to provide a judicial and institutional framework for addressing the land problem in Kenya.

2.2.4 ICC verdict and implications for national cohesion and security
The 2007/2008 post election violence lingers in the mind of every Kenyan. Since the country was unable to establish a local tribunal as recommended by the Waki report, four Kenyans have since been confirmed as bearing the greatest responsibility during a pre-trial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Among the four, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto have declared presidential ambitions in the 2013 general elections and command a substantial constituency.
of supporters. Pending local court cases seeking determination of their candidature based on the ICC’s pre-trial chamber verdict is feared to complicate the healing process should the local courts bar them from contesting.

2.2.5 Devolution and the fate of the Provincial Administration
Although the constitution provides room for the restructuring of the Provincial Administration within five years so that it is in sync with the devolved governance system, the fate of the system as it exists today has remained a major nightmare among Kenyans. On several occasions, MPs have expressed opinions to the effect that should the Executive decide to retain or partially restructure the Provincial Administration as has been demonstrated by the previous as well as the current regime, the spirit and letter of devolution would be greatly undermined.

2.2.6 IDP resettlement and the prospects for repeat election-related chaos
Although the government insists most of the genuine PEV IDPs have been resettled and that the few remaining will be resettled before December 2012, questions abound on its commitment. There are fears that the process is marred with corruption leading to wastage of government resources as a significant number of Kenyans remain in IDP camps. There are concerns that meaningful reconciliation and healing cannot take place while some victims of PEV remain in IDP Camps.

4 years down the line, thousands of IDPs are still in camps, making nonsense the process of reconciliation and healing.
3.0 Key Findings

The following is a synopsis of the key findings of the bi-annual survey that was conducted in 18 Counties between October 2011 and March 2012. The findings are based on citizen’s perception and level of understanding of the key reform agendas under the auspices of Agenda Four as agreed during the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation framework in 2008.

3.1 Citizens level of awareness of Agenda 4 Reforms

It was established that while majority of the respondents (63.8%) indicated that they have heard of Agenda Four reforms; only an insignificant number could identify these reform items. Indeed, only 22% mentioned Land as one of the reformed items despite land being at the centre of cyclic conflicts that have dogged the country for decades. 20.2% mentioned police reforms, 9.4% and 7.9% constitution and judiciary respectively.

The survey found out that knowledge of the Agenda Four reforms varied on two main fronts; age and education.

The surveys found out that a tiny minority of respondents could identify specific Agenda 4 Reform items.

Figure 1: Reform items mentioned by respondents
Respondents aged 21-40 years were more informed of the reforms agenda compared to other age groups. Those at younger brackets were even more ignorant. Moreover, it is the 21-40 year old who various reports indicate were at the epicenter of the PEV as perpetrators. They are also more politically active and literate compared to the younger and the elderly, commonly seen as the victims.

The survey further sought to gain an insight into the various sources of information through which citizens relied to monitor the reform process in the country. Close to 50% of respondents mentioned the radio followed by print media and television at 20.2% and 19.8% respectively. The social media, accounted for an insignificant 6.4%, despite the phenomenal growth and preference in urban centres, perhaps a statement that rural Kenya still experiences monumental challenges in as far as access to information and communication technology (ICT) is concerned. The civil society were rated at a lowly 1.5% raising concern over the impact of various on going civic education touching on ‘Agenda Four’ and other related reforms in the country.

3.2 Government’s Commitment to Implementing Reforms
In the last four years, the country has witnessed a wide range of reforms touching virtually all facets of governance. Numerous supportive independent bodies, institutions and organs have been established to give the much-needed impetus to the reform process, including the ‘Agenda 4’ commissions.

However, implementation of key provisions of the constitution and Agenda 4 reform items has been sluggish. This includes the much needed police reforms, land reforms, national reconciliation and healing and restructuring of the Provincial Administration. It is against this background that the survey sought to find out if the government was doing enough to expedite the reform implementation process.

On the national reconciliation and healing following the post election violence, 23.1% of respondents were of
the view that the Government was not doing enough. 56.0% observed that the Government was “trying” by establishing structures, institutions and organs. Further, a lowly 4.8% were however “not aware” at all of any efforts being made by the Government to promote inter-communal reconciliation and healing in the country.

The main inference from the finding on national reconciliation and healing is that, although the reform process calls for public participation, such participation is limited to those who can access the main sources of information—Radio, newspapers and television. The issue of unsettled IDPs may also have played a big part in influencing response, where the feeling has been the government need to have settled all IDPs to claim some respect on national reconciliation and healing.

3.3 Institutional Reforms: The Police, Judiciary and Provincial Administration
The Waki report found out that the Police were unprepared and failed to take the necessary proactive steps to reduce the opportunity for violence to erupt or escalate. To address this deficiency, the report recommended a comprehensive reform of the Kenya Police Service and Administration Police. This included establishment of an Independent Police Conduct Authority and Integration of Administration Police into Kenya Police Service.

On the other hand, the Report of the National Task Force on Police Reforms also recommended that to improve Police capacity to prevent violence; tooling, logistical and technological capacity of the police services be reviewed to establish the exact needs and specification in order to bring policing to international standards. In particular, the report emphasized priority be given to communication and information, technology and transportation.
Although there is significant progress in creating key institutions proposed in reforming the police, the survey found out that a significant number of Kenyans, 34.6%, have not experienced any change in police service delivery, arguing that the political class was not keen in comprehensively reforming the institution.

However, 52.8% opined that the police service has improved compared to 2007/8. Indeed, the enactment of the National Police Service Act, The National Police Service Commission Act, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act and the constitution of a panel to vet members of National Police Service Commission was voted as major progress.

On Judiciary, there has been remarkable progress over the years, beginning with 2003 “radical Surgery” of Kiraitu Murungi to the current new constitutional dispensation, 2010 that provides a raft of judicial reforms.

The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV), popularly referred to as the Waki report found out that the Police were unprepared and failed to take the necessary proactive steps to reduce the opportunity for violence to eventuate.

But while today the Judiciary has exhibited notable enthusiasm in embracing and implementing wide-ranging reforms including vetting of judges and magistrates, conducting open and inclusive job interviews and above all recent unprecedented landmark rulings, both the
Executive and the Legislature seem to be quite sluggish - even reluctant or resistant – in their uptake of key reforms. Rulings against personalities such as DCJ, former president Daniel Arap Moi and members of his family, serving and former senior state officials such as cabinet ministers and Provincial Administrators are, by and large, developments which continue to reverberate across the country and, serve to send the message that nobody (as the Constitution so provides) is above the law. Closely tied to this is the fact that since being appointed to office, the Chief Justice himself – both by his actions and personal demeanour – has been able to redeem the hitherto fast-waning public confidence and goodwill in the Judiciary, which had for eons been seen to be no more than an incorrigible enclave of corruption, inefficiency and impunity.

Indeed, the survey found out that majority of Kenyans, 66.4%, have confidence with judiciary and strongly believe judicial reforms were on course. It was found out that this attitudinal change of perception is attributed in large measure to the vetting process of judicial officers and the injection of “new reformist blood” in the system, notably the recruitment of competent and independent-minded Chief Justice and other senior members of the Bench.

In regards to the Provincial Administration, a structure which is generally viewed as a repressive colonial system inherited and perfected by post independence regimes, there was a feeling that little was being done to restructure it to conform to the new governance structure as provided in the Constitution. Although the constitution provides for five years to restructure this system, only 19.7% of the respondents believed that the restructuring will ever happen. This finding could be as a result of conflicting information and mixed signals on the part of the Executive arm of government about the fate of the Provincial Administration, especially its recent attempt to appoint County Commissioners. 29.0% were of the view that reforms on this outfit were only cosmetic and pretentious.
This view is reinforced when juxtaposed with the future – or fate – of the Provincial Administration structure where, close to half (46.9%) of the interviewees proposed that this edifice should be “abolished altogether”, compared to a lowly 17.3% who would rather the status quo be retained. This apparent “vote of no confidence” in the Provincial Administration could be largely attributed to the lingering historical and colonial-era vestiges in which it is inextricably associated – and loathed.

Asked about the specific role this arm of government should perform vis-a-vis the County government executive committee, the respondents overwhelmingly cited “provision of security” as the fundamental role that justified its retention.

46.9% of the respondents felt that Provincial Administration should be abolished altogether.

Figure 2: Bar Graph showing responses concerning the fate of Provincial Administration where the majority opined that the structure be abolished and staff deployed to other ministries

With regard to whether or not County governments should play an active role in the management of security functions alongside the national government, over half, 56.2% of the respondents said that they should indeed play an active role, while a significant number, 31.0%, disapproved of their role in this sector, preferring instead that it be managed in its entirety by the national government. The central argument here was that in cosmopolitan Counties,
the majority ethnic groups may force the Governor and County Executive to play to their whims. Central government will not be faced by this challenge since its officers are appointed by the central government and not subject to County elections dynamics that may determine who becomes the Governor.

3.4 Land Reforms
Both the Waki and Kriegler reports concurred the land question was at the nerve of PEV. As such, it was the expectation of the whole country that land reforms should top the priority list of reforms. Since independence, Kenya has been struggling with the land problem. Indeed, Kenya’s land has been commandeered as a tool of wielding and protecting power rather than as a means of production to enable majority households to produce their food, provide shelter and housing and actively engage in the national economy. Thus, while land remains a major determinant of social status, political power and economic standing in Kenyan society, efforts at land reform have been, more often than not, severely compromised by political elites and their cronies.

Indeed, the survey found out that majority of Kenyans, 66%, were not satisfied with the manner in which land

Figure 3: Pie Chart showing respondents’ level of satisfaction with land reforms

While land remains a major determinant of social status, political power and economic standing in Kenyan society, efforts at land reform have been, more often than not, severely compromised by political elites and their friends.
reforms were being conducted by the government. The government’s inability or reluctance to resettle the thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) still languishing in squalor some four years after they were forcefully uprooted from their domiciles was cited as evidence.

The survey observed that there was a great deal of public discontent in the manner in which the Ministry of Lands was handling the land reforms. It was found out that Kenyans were highly pessimistic about commitment to land reforms citing endemic and deeply-entrenched corruption and inefficiency at the Ministry of Lands as the main problem. As a result;

- Multiple issuance of ownership documents for one piece of land,
- Surreptitious grabbing and expropriation of community land by crafty and well-connected powerful cartels,
- Failure by the Ministry to survey, demarcate and adjudicate individual as well as communally-held land perpetuates the “squatter phenomenon” and the all too-common intermittent incidences of land-based conflicts across the country.

Additionally, respondents opined that the land reform process was being curtailed by all those who are holding unusually large and idle parcels of land, and or those who have grabbed public land.

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Asked about what can be done to salvage the situation, 54.9% of the respondents had no idea. However, some
minority offered diverse options to address the chronic “land question” in the country;

- Stemming endemic corruption and inefficiency at the Ministry of Lands;
- Speedy establishment and operationalization of the National Land Commission (NLC)
- Issuance of land ownership documents
- Promotion of the tenets of transparency and accountability in exercising land transfer transactions
- Scaling up of civic education programmes on land ownership as outlined under the Constitution of Kenya.

The Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) and the Kazi Kwa Vijana (jobs for Youth) initiatives are some of the initiatives that are geared towards ameliorating youth unemployment but the surveys found out that the two initiatives have little impact in the grassroots.

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Figure 4: Graph showing respondents’ solution to land problem in Kenya

### 3.5 Youth Unemployment

The issue of youth unemployment remain a monumental challenge to the authorities in Kenya. Although the government came up with various initiatives to address the problem including the establishment of the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) in 2006 and the Kazi Kwa Vijana (jobs for youth) in 2010, the survey nevertheless established that 62% of Kenyans do not believe the government was committed in addressing youth unemployment.

Key informants observed that these initiatives tended
to benefit an insignificant portion of youth either due to nepotism/tribalism and/or the imposition of stringent guidelines and conditions. Moreover, the re-emergence of certain criminal gangs like Mungiki in some parts of the country (Central, Nairobi and Rift Valley provinces) coupled with the alleged recruitment of youths in North Eastern province to join Al Shabaab in Somalia is a pointer that youth unemployment is still a major huddle to be overcome by policy makers and those in position of authority.

Tied to youth unemployment is skewed distribution of resources whose both the Waki and Kligler reports observed was based on tribal considerations and as such made stakes in the office of the Presidency very high and part of the reason people, especially the youthful population, fought during PEV. However, the survey found out that Kenyans were generally satisfied with reforms related with resource distribution citing the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and road network in the country as testimony that there were a discernible commitment by the government. Indeed, over 70.0% of respondents felt the distribution had been either “good” or “fairly good” in the last five years.

### 3.6 Addressing Impunity: The ICC Process

Impunity has been at the nerve Centre of the election related violence in Kenya since 1992. Those who planned, sponsored or executed the election related violence in 1992, 1997 and 2005 were not brought to account for their criminal acts. Arising from this, those accused of bearing the greatest responsibility in as far as instigation of PEV in 2007/8 thought it was business as usual owing to weak state institutions and successfully scuttled efforts to establish local tribunal. Reigning on impunity was one of the key reform agenda recommended by the Waki commission.

Since the country was unable to establish a local tribunal to deal with PEV cases, the International Criminal Court (ICC) took over the cases, leading to confirmation of four Kenyans for full trial at the court. The entrance of ICC into the Kenyan case was hailed by many as the beginning of the end of the culture of impunity in Kenya, with cumulative result being peaceful elections in future.

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Due to unacceptably high levels of unemployment amongst the youth in Kenya, they are prone to be recruited into criminal/outlawed gangs like Mungiki and Al Shabaab.
When asked about the fairness of the ICC process, about 60% of the respondents’ supported the decision of the court, while 35% considered the decision as unfair. The survey revealed that ethnic and political inclination were major determining factors that influenced respondent opinion rather than an objective analysis of the facts. Indeed, a follow-up qualitative question corroborated this argument, since those who faulted the ICC process viewed it as a political scheme to ‘fix’ the suspects rather than the need to address criminality. It was found out that the misconception has been perpetuated by some of the accused persons and their cronies mainly to win sympathy from their communities.

Moreover, the new found camaraderie between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin (who bitterly fought during the 2007/8 post election chaos) could well be based on a shared “victim syndrome” rather than a conscious political ideology.

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Sampled Kenyans were of the view that the ICC process was the Country’s best bet of reigning on the culture of impunity that has characterized election related violence since the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1991.

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Figure 5: Chart showing opinion on ICC verdict on Ocampo 4 where it is observed that majority of the respondents consider the ICC process as fair.
4.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

4.1 Conclusions
The survey findings supports the conclusion that there exists a scanty but steadily growing sense of awareness and interest about the raft of constitutional and Agenda Four reforms in the country. This calls for a sustained, well coordinated, coherent and well targeted civic education and campaign to empower the citizenry to be able to interrogate and make informed choices in matters pertaining to their security and good governance including elections.

It was found out that, by and large, ethnicity and political inclinations continue to influence and affect community attitude and perceptions of public institutions. As a result, the long standing challenge of resettling IDPs, the fight against endemic corruption and maladministration in government, interpretation of Chapter 6 (Leadership and Integrity) of the Constitution and, most fundamentally, the highly emotive ‘Land Question’, have all been interpreted on ethnic and political basis.

In spite of the overwhelming pre-Referendum consensus among Kenyans in 2005 to abolish the so-called Provincial Administration behemoth to which Kenya’s autocratic rule had been inextricably linked, the research was able to detect a considerable ‘softening up’ – even outright empathy and defence – of this structure. The ‘Wako draft’ that was disapproved during the 2005 plebiscite had expressly recommended this system be abolished. Unfounded reports allege that the Wako draft was rejected simply because local administrators who were to be rendered jobless after abolition of the system campaigned hard against it, albeit behind the scenes. On further analysis, it was found that, generally, the relatively young and educated segment of the sample population tended to be diametrically opposed to this outfit, while the older and less educated appeared to root for its retention. Moreover, communities tended to take cue from the positions taken by their “political heroes” rather than through an objective and dispassionate analysis of the merits and demerits of the structure.
4.2 Recommendations

• There is need for the government to make provision for civic education an integral component of its overall service delivery, rather than the current whimsical, adhoc approach, as in the mooted Kenya National Integrated Civic Education (K-NICE) programme. Ultimately, an informed citizenry invariably translates into better governance, not vice versa;

• There is need to educate the citizenry on the roles and functions of the Devolved governance system in order to address the high levels of ignorance and misconception around the meaning of the soon-to-be established County government structure, where communities mistakenly belief that these units are autonomous ethnic enclaves exclusive only to “indigenous” locals. There is need to carefully address the false sense of “entitlement mind-set” for it could potentially balkanize the country along ethnic lines, thereby undermining current national reconciliation, cohesion and integration efforts.

• The civil society, private sector and the communities should compliment the efforts of the various ‘Agenda Four’ commissions and related processes in order to satisfactorily deliver on their respective mandates.

• There is need to conduct periodic empirical research to determine community/citizen knowledge, attitude and perception of the reform process since this is a useful mechanism for gauging the country’s political pulse, and using it to forestall or at least minimize eruption of violent conflicts in future.

• The authorities should take pre-emptive measures to avert potential overlap – or even outright collision - of roles at the county level, especially on matters touching on security by formulating clear, coherent and unambiguous roles and reporting structures between national and county governments, as provided for in the Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2012).